防止美国福岛

Limited Progress Five Years after Japan’s 核能 Plant Disaster

2016年2月23日发布

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2011年3月, a massive earthquake and tsunami triggered a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in northern Japan. 三个反应堆发生核熔毁, releasing significant amounts of radiation and stunning a world that had been led to believe that nuclear power was safe .

Following the accident, a task force of senior staff at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a 96-page report, detailing their recommendations for protecting the U.S. 民众从福岛规模的灾难中逃生. 五年后,美国核管理委员会负责美国核电站的安全.S. nuclear reactors—has either rejected or weakened nearly all of its own staff’s recommendations. Of the changes that have been made—including implementation of the so-called “FLEX” program—it remains unclear whether the money and time invested will yield significant safety improvements.

我们的建议

The Fukushima nuclear disaster wasn’t caused by just an earthquake and a tidal wave—it was also the result of a complacent nuclear power industry and an ineffective regulator. 美国.S. 对这些令人大开眼界的事件的反应, 在某种程度上, highlighted the very same fundamental problems: industry hasn’t taken nuclear safety as seriously as it should, and the NRC has failed to strengthen its regulatory framework.

We believe the NRC should revisit its post-Fukushima recommendations by adopting the following measures:

  • 修订规管架构. The NRC’s current structure works against public safety.
  • 加快将乏燃料转移到干桶.相对简单的测量方法 能帮助防止严重的辐射泄漏吗.
  • 增加应急规划区域的规模. The current radius of 10 miles doesn’t reflect the actual range of dangerous radioactive fallout released during Fukushima.
  • 加强核管理委员会对操作员指导方针的监督. Guidelines for reactor management during a core-melt accident are currently maintained voluntarily and aren’t subject to NRC enforcement.
  • 验证FLEX策略. The NRC should stress test the FLEX program to clearly understand and address its limitations.

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